Dissertation:
Regime Agnosticism: Tacitus on the Nature of Republics and the Growth of Savagery
Does regime type matter for politics? How should republicans in particular think about regime type, especially given the legacy of the Roman mixed regime? While we might normally think of regime type as being determinative of politics, I argue that this is less true than it appears at first glance. Through a reading of the Roman historian Tacitus, I show that republicanism is best understood as a politics of virtue and vice rather than a prescribed set of constitutional arrangements.
While Tacitus has not been read in this way before, attending to his use of rhetorical strategies allows us to see that he offers an oblique criticism of the Roman principate grounded in the emperors’ character, not any inherent problem with the rule of one. Using Stoic themes, he condemns the emperors as vicious, cruel, and a corrupting influence on Roman political life. Since his criticism is non-institutional, I read Tacitus as a regime agnostic republican. I call this interpretation “regime agnostic” because on this view behaviors and choices are the basic elements of politics, and certain choices – virtues – are the constitutive element of specifically republican politics.
Tacitus is therefore a much more interesting political thinker than he has been given credit for. Contemporary republicans, especially the “neo-Romans,” read him as a forerunner to their own project of reimagining the mixed regime. Yet Tacitus’s regime agnostic republicanism raises pointed questions about the neo-Roman understanding of republicanism. Beyond the historical issues, it is too legalistic and so it misunderstands the nature of liberty and domination. Tacitus helps us to cut through these overly formal and structural definitions of liberty and domination to see them for what they are – behaviors. I argue that this raises a continuity between ancient republicanism and a certain strand of liberal thought, though Tacitus does more than merely anticipate this. He offers theoretical resources for understanding the efficacy of individual action (and the importance of theorizing this), the nature of cruelty as a political problem, the need for virtue in both liberal and democratic societies, and the stakes of these concepts for liberal aspirations.
Regime Agnosticism: Tacitus on the Nature of Republics and the Growth of Savagery
Does regime type matter for politics? How should republicans in particular think about regime type, especially given the legacy of the Roman mixed regime? While we might normally think of regime type as being determinative of politics, I argue that this is less true than it appears at first glance. Through a reading of the Roman historian Tacitus, I show that republicanism is best understood as a politics of virtue and vice rather than a prescribed set of constitutional arrangements.
While Tacitus has not been read in this way before, attending to his use of rhetorical strategies allows us to see that he offers an oblique criticism of the Roman principate grounded in the emperors’ character, not any inherent problem with the rule of one. Using Stoic themes, he condemns the emperors as vicious, cruel, and a corrupting influence on Roman political life. Since his criticism is non-institutional, I read Tacitus as a regime agnostic republican. I call this interpretation “regime agnostic” because on this view behaviors and choices are the basic elements of politics, and certain choices – virtues – are the constitutive element of specifically republican politics.
Tacitus is therefore a much more interesting political thinker than he has been given credit for. Contemporary republicans, especially the “neo-Romans,” read him as a forerunner to their own project of reimagining the mixed regime. Yet Tacitus’s regime agnostic republicanism raises pointed questions about the neo-Roman understanding of republicanism. Beyond the historical issues, it is too legalistic and so it misunderstands the nature of liberty and domination. Tacitus helps us to cut through these overly formal and structural definitions of liberty and domination to see them for what they are – behaviors. I argue that this raises a continuity between ancient republicanism and a certain strand of liberal thought, though Tacitus does more than merely anticipate this. He offers theoretical resources for understanding the efficacy of individual action (and the importance of theorizing this), the nature of cruelty as a political problem, the need for virtue in both liberal and democratic societies, and the stakes of these concepts for liberal aspirations.
Publications:
"Dostoyevsky and the Defense of Compassion" (Political Research Quarterly)
Is cruelty a problem for politics? For Hannah Arendt, the answer was no. On her view, a compassionate response towards persons suffering cruelty is best avoided because compassion can only become political by transforming incommunicable individual pain into abstract suffering. At crucial moments in her argument in On Revolution, she cites the great Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky as an ally. However, I argue that Arendt misrepresents Dostoyevsky. Through a critical examination of his mature novels, I show how suffering is communicable and compassion is political for Dostoyevsky. By attending to this theme in his writings, I argue that Dostoyevsky sheds light on the problem of cruelty in a way that Arendt’s framework cannot. This suggests that he is more at home with theorists like Judith Shklar who “put cruelty first” than with Arendt, although in favoring compassion I argue that he departs from Shklar’s liberalism of fear and offers a more constructive, hopeful political vision.
"Servile Stories and Contested Histories: Empire, Memory, and Criticism in Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita" (accepted at Polis)
Scholars often turn to Livy’s famous digression on Aulus Cossus and the spolia opima (4.17-20) to shed light on his larger political inclinations. These readings generally view Livy as either an Augustan (or at least a patriotic Roman) or an apolitical skeptic. Yet neither view, I argue, fully explains the Cossus affair. What is needed is an interpretation that recognizes the political nature of the Cossus digression and its skepticism toward Augustus. Reading the digression this way shows that Livy raises fundamental and critical political questions about Augustus’s regime and his claim to rule. In doing so, Livy offers theoretical insight into nature of despotism, namely, that it seeks to control narratives of the past just as much as it aims for political domination.
"Dostoyevsky and the Defense of Compassion" (Political Research Quarterly)
Is cruelty a problem for politics? For Hannah Arendt, the answer was no. On her view, a compassionate response towards persons suffering cruelty is best avoided because compassion can only become political by transforming incommunicable individual pain into abstract suffering. At crucial moments in her argument in On Revolution, she cites the great Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky as an ally. However, I argue that Arendt misrepresents Dostoyevsky. Through a critical examination of his mature novels, I show how suffering is communicable and compassion is political for Dostoyevsky. By attending to this theme in his writings, I argue that Dostoyevsky sheds light on the problem of cruelty in a way that Arendt’s framework cannot. This suggests that he is more at home with theorists like Judith Shklar who “put cruelty first” than with Arendt, although in favoring compassion I argue that he departs from Shklar’s liberalism of fear and offers a more constructive, hopeful political vision.
"Servile Stories and Contested Histories: Empire, Memory, and Criticism in Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita" (accepted at Polis)
Scholars often turn to Livy’s famous digression on Aulus Cossus and the spolia opima (4.17-20) to shed light on his larger political inclinations. These readings generally view Livy as either an Augustan (or at least a patriotic Roman) or an apolitical skeptic. Yet neither view, I argue, fully explains the Cossus affair. What is needed is an interpretation that recognizes the political nature of the Cossus digression and its skepticism toward Augustus. Reading the digression this way shows that Livy raises fundamental and critical political questions about Augustus’s regime and his claim to rule. In doing so, Livy offers theoretical insight into nature of despotism, namely, that it seeks to control narratives of the past just as much as it aims for political domination.
Book Reviews:
Review of Roosevelt Montás, Rescuing Socrates (forthcoming in the Michigan Journal of Law and Society)
Review of Roosevelt Montás, Rescuing Socrates (forthcoming in the Michigan Journal of Law and Society)
Working Papers:
"Republican Virtues and Imperial Vices: Tacitus’s Non-Institutional Critique of the Roman Principate"
No reader can fail to recognize the moral dimension to Tacitus's narratives. Yet his moral thinking is often regarded as merely conventional. In this article, I challenge that view and argue that Tacitus uses Stoic ethical ideas to criticize the Roman emperors for their vices. Rather than finding inherent fault with monarchy as a regime type, Tacitus condemns the emperors as unjust and immoderate in their rule. Moderation in particular is a key political virtue for Tacitus, being the theoretical underpinning for justice and liberty. Recognizing this non-institutional critique raises critical questions for certain contemporary republicans, especially the "neo-Romans," whose political philosophizing grants conceptual priority to institutions at the expense of virtue.
"Republican Virtues and Imperial Vices: Tacitus’s Non-Institutional Critique of the Roman Principate"
No reader can fail to recognize the moral dimension to Tacitus's narratives. Yet his moral thinking is often regarded as merely conventional. In this article, I challenge that view and argue that Tacitus uses Stoic ethical ideas to criticize the Roman emperors for their vices. Rather than finding inherent fault with monarchy as a regime type, Tacitus condemns the emperors as unjust and immoderate in their rule. Moderation in particular is a key political virtue for Tacitus, being the theoretical underpinning for justice and liberty. Recognizing this non-institutional critique raises critical questions for certain contemporary republicans, especially the "neo-Romans," whose political philosophizing grants conceptual priority to institutions at the expense of virtue.
Works in Progress:
A Blessed Age? Tacitus, Trajan, and Free Speech
Stoic Affection and Imperial Savagery
I am happy to email drafts and discuss them upon request.
A Blessed Age? Tacitus, Trajan, and Free Speech
Stoic Affection and Imperial Savagery
I am happy to email drafts and discuss them upon request.
